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Introduction
In 2005, after decades of civil war, the people of South Sudan were victorious against the
northern Republic of Sudan and created their own autonomous government. They followed the
modern trend of instituting democratic elections and a presidential system, with a bicameral
legislature and an independent judiciary. The young regime employed all the building blocks of
a modern stable democracy. By 2011, South Sudan declared its full independence from the
Republic of Sudan. The country was admitted to the United Nations and internationally
recognized as Africa’s newest state.
But the stability and legitimacy of this auspicious beginning quickly deteriorated. Within
two years, ethnic tensions turned into outright conflict, the President and Vice President led
armies against each other, and all the stability that a democratic regime was expected to offer
was nowhere to be found.
South Sudan’s case of democratic failure is not unique. Many countries all over the
world have made attempts to discard an old regime and install a democracy, to varying degrees
of success. Some democratic regimes have brought stable peace to their countries and freedom
to their citizens; others have sputtered out almost instantly, or flipped back and forth between
democratic and authoritarian regimes over the years. Although democracy is currently the most
preferred form of government for its guarantee of mutual peace and stability, its track record
over the past century has been noticeably spotty. South Sudan is only the most recent example
of democracy not meeting expectations; other countries in different regions with different
histories have experienced similar regime collapse accompanied by different disruptive
circumstances.
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Why do so many democratic states fail? It is not difficult to find convenient answers
specific to South Sudan to explain the collapse of its state. The country’s lack of resources and
historical ethnic divisions are clearly the immediate causes of the conflict and famine ravaging
South Sudan. However, the widespread preference for democracy is based in part on the fact
that its institutions should be able to withstand such transient hardships. Perhaps ethnic warfare
was inevitable in South Sudan, but the democratic institutions put in place are supposed to be
able to weather and maybe even ameliorate such disruptive situations. If this sort of
governmental failure was a singular event, then perhaps it could be attributed to a sort of perfect
storm of factors that no regime could stand against. Since South Sudan is only one of many such
young democracies that have failed soon after their inception, it might be time to look past the
specific circumstantial factors and consider whether the democratic institutions themselves might
bear some of the fault.
Humanity’s preference for democratic institutions is a very recent phenomenon. With
only a few exceptions, most governments throughout history have been built around a strict
hierarchy of authority that was relatively independent of the general populace. The focus of such
government was on maintaining the cohesion of the state, and it was less concerned with
respecting the opinions and rights of citizens. With the spread of liberalism and its
individualistic view of society, the popularity of a form of government that placed those rights on
a pedestal greatly increased. By making the governing hierarchy accountable to the people,
democracy provided a simple way to ensure that more attention and care was given to individual
citizens of a society.
But did that liberalism come at a price? It would seem that democracy, in focusing
attention on the will of the people, may lose some of the ability of previous forms of government
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to maintain the cohesion of the state as a whole. Though everyone enjoys the freedom of action
allowed by liberal democracy, at some point the act of governing still requires certain people to
have the authority to tell others what to do. To compromise, pure democracy is usually tempered
into a representative republic, in which officials are ultimately dependent on the voters for their
positions, but can operate relatively independently to maintain the state once in office. This
republican model seems to succeed in balancing the desire for liberty and the need for authority,
and so has become the staple regime type for new countries seeking a state that is both desirable
and effective.

The Usual Suspects: Demagoguery and Tyranny of the Majority
Although the election of public officials by the people is intended to give the people a say
in how they are governed, such a system places a large burden on the populace to select a good
leader. One way in which the populace can fail to select a beneficent leader is by electing a
demagogue, a leader who achieves political power through general popularity alone. By
appealing to the base concerns of the general population, a demagogue can achieve a large base
of support and thus become a highly legitimate leader from a democratic standpoint. But being
popular does not necessarily correlate to being a good leader. On the one hand, once in power,
demagogues have the opportunity to ignore the pleas of the masses and use their new authority to
enact self-serving policies, reducing the liberty of the people in the process. On the other hand, a
demagogue might follow through with their popular policy proposals, tearing apart the
foundational institutions of the state and reducing its cohesive authority. Both of these are worst
case scenarios; there is always the possibility that a populist leader could carefully maintain both
the people’s freedom and the government’s authority. But if a demagogue turns out to be a bad
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leader, there is not much that the people can do in response. The leader was very legitimately
elected, and the people must wait until the next election cycle to respond to the leader’s
transgressions.
Another issue of placing the burden of government on the people is that they will attempt
to use their political power to serve their own ends. When citizens vote, they have no reason to
vote in any way that contradicts their own apparent interest. Since voting operates in such a way
that the proposal with the most votes is interpreted as representative of the general desire of the
people, those citizens who voted against the proposal have had their political wills essentially
nullified. This phenomenon, the tyranny of the majority, can be seen at the level of the
legislative assembly as well. In a two-party system, the political party possessing the majority of
the seats has almost unchecked power, while the minority party can only vainly express their
stances before being voted against every time. On a larger scale, the inherent winner-vs-loser
aspect of voting systems creates a situation in which a large class of people can enact policies
which exploit a slightly smaller class of people, and the interests of the smaller class can be
ignored with impunity.
Demagoguery and the tyranny of the majority are two of the most apparent weaknesses of
a democratic system, and democracies throughout history have taken steps to avoid such
problems through structural systems of checks and balances. The voting power of factions and
individuals can be diluted in various ways, minorities can be protected by bills of rights and
proportional representation, and the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers can
prevent any single leader or government branch from centralizing large amounts of government
authority in themselves. The problems of voting and democratic rule are so evident that nearly
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every democratic state has instituted some variation of these checks and balances to prevent such
institutional flaws from damaging the democracy.
Yet modern democracies still fail at an alarming rate. Are the institutional checks and
balances failing to prevent some of the expected issues with governments based on popular
voting? Or is there some other cause of failure outside of the institutional structures themselves?

A Philosophical Consideration of Democratic Failure
To examine these questions, I have decided to analyze several cases of democratic forms
of government and determine how well they dealt with the expected problems of voting-based
governments and how they were or were not able to maintain the cohesion of such a government.
I will be comparing a few examples of failed modern democracies with arguably
history’s longest lasting democratic government: the Roman Republic. While longevity does not
guarantee an ethically good regime, it does suggest that the regime was able to resist becoming
so unbearable that was overthrown by its citizens or so weak that it was toppled by external
threats. In this way, longevity can signal an effective balance between government authority and
citizens’ freedom, and thus it will be used as a measure of a successful regime. Despite the
eventual fall of the Republic, its stability over nearly five centuries of existence makes it as close
to a success story as can be found in the real world.
Unlike the gradual democratization of many successful modern Western democracies, the
Roman Republic transformed particularly suddenly from a monarchy to democracy. The
beginnings of many failed modern democracies bear much more resemblance to the sudden birth
of the Roman Republic than to the slow introduction of democracy in countries such as America.
Though America would be an obvious choice for a case study about democracy and freedom, it
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does not fit the particular paradigm that I have chosen to investigate; while Rome and the two
failed modern democracies set up democratic institutions practically from scratch, America was
built on a foundation laid by centuries of British democratic reforms.
Although separated by over two thousand years of political and philosophical
developments, the basic governing structures of both the Republic and modern democracies are
remarkably similar, and had to confront similar difficulties. All of the governments in question
possessed checks and balances, a mixed constitution, and participation by the citizenry, while
dealing with remnants of foreign rule and warring neighboring nations. Yet the modern
democratic governments fell apart after no more than a decade or two, while the Roman
Republic was able to sustain its institutions for half a millennium. What did the Republic do
differently than the modern democracies in its early years that could account for such longevity?
The most relevant differences between the Republic and modern democracies may turn
out to be their specific conceptions of liberty and its relevance to democratic institutions. Both
make the freedom of the individual a priority of the government, but to different degrees and by
different means. In the first two chapters, I will explain how their different approaches to
balancing individual liberty and governmental authority allowed the Roman Republic to succeed
and several modern democracies to fail as sustainable forms of government.
The final chapter will look back at the issues of democracy through a philosophical lens.
Though an overwhelming number of philosophers throughout history have written about the
ideas of freedom and democracy, I have chosen to focus on the two thinkers whom I believe are
most relevant to my comparison of ancient and modern democracies: Aristotle and John Stuart
Mill. Aristotle provides a thorough consideration of government forms in the ancient world, at a
time when democracy was not viewed as favorably as it is today. Mill writes at a time when
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liberal democracy is just beginning to be recognized as a triumph of human achievement, and he
considers such representative government to be the best possible government form. Despite their
contrasting historical perspectives, Aristotle and Mill are connected by their belief that the
purpose, or telos, of government is what determines its success. By looking at various
democratic institutions and underlying philosophical theories, this paper will consider the
relationship of democracy and freedom with regards to the best form of government.
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Chapter One: Roman Liberty
“Quirites, regem create!”
After the death of its founder Romulus, the Roman throne lay empty. With no
established plan for succession, the hundred senators decided to split themselves into ten
“decuries,” with one senator chosen from each decury to wield the power of a king. These ten
interreges exercised their authority in rotating shifts: each one was granted unlimited power for a
span of five days at a time. This distribution of power continued for a full year, but eventually
the Roman people began to chafe under what they called a “multiplied slavery, a hundred men
made masters instead of one.” (Livy, 1.17) In anticipation of the growing discontent, the Senate
freely bestowed on the people the power to elect their own king. Livy describes the populace as
so grateful for the ability to choose their own monarch that they immediately voted to give such
authority back to the Senate.
Under the guidance of the Senate, the Roman monarch continued to be elected by the
people for the next several generations. The last popularly-elected king, Tarquinius Priscus,
even went so far as to campaign for the position and give stump speeches to earn the favor of the
crowd. (Livy, 1.35) This democratic system seems to have been pleasing to the people and an
effective form of government for two centuries, until the final king seized his throne by force and
without election.
But even when they were under the rule of the benevolent, democratically-elected
monarchs, Livy asserts that the Roman people were not free. Their dissatisfaction with the
interregnum rule of the decuries may have been a foreshadowing of future desires for freedom,
but at the same time, the Roman people wanted to consolidate power into a single person, the
opposite of the eventual Republican trend of distributing power. Livy dismisses the people’s
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petition to restore the unitary monarchy through election as naïve, attributing their desire for
election to the fact that they had “not yet experienced the sweetness of liberty.” (Livy, 1.17)
Livy seems to consider popular elections to be an insufficient instrument of freedom when
viewed in relation to some more general and preferable concept of liberty.
The shift from rule by ten unelected interreges to rule by a single elected king seems like
both a step toward liberty and a step away from it; the Roman people gained the ability to choose
who governs them, but lost the distribution of power inherent in the five-day shifts of the
interreges. Admittedly, the desire for change might have been born out of frustration at the
inconstancy of having a different executive leader every week, rather than from a budding desire
for political efficacy; as Livy notes, the people were quite willing to renounce their newfound
right to vote after the Senate assured them that the unitary monarchy would be restored.
Whatever the motivations of the Roman people under the monarchy, the juxtaposition of free
elections and a single supreme ruler raises many questions about the Roman concept of liberty
and how it was translated into their political institutions.

Two Types of Freedom
After considering the distinctive government of the Roman monarchy, it would seem that
there exist two different concepts of freedom which are not mutually necessary. On the one
hand, there is the freedom to participate in government. The ability to gain political office, serve
on a jury, and have a say in the creation and enforcement of laws are all aspects of this type of
freedom. On the other hand, there is freedom from the tyranny of government. Systems of
checks and balances, the separation of power, and guarantees of individual rights comprise this
concept of freedom.
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There seem to be some apparent overlaps between the two conceptual freedoms; for
example, free individual expression can be both a tool for civic participation as well as a right
that might need to be protected from governmental overreach. However, Berlin, in his essay
“Two Concepts of Liberty,” claims that there is no necessary connection between freedom from
tyranny (which he calls negative freedom) and freedom to govern oneself (positive freedom). He
explains that a “liberal-minded despot” might very well allow his subjects plenty of rights and
freedom to do as they please, though they have no say in how the nation is governed.1 Berlin
takes this separation of the two types of freedom to its logical conclusion: “For the ‘positive’
sense of liberty comes to light if we try to answer the question, not ‘What am I free to do or be?’,
but ‘By whom am I ruled?’ …the connection between democracy and individual liberty is a good
deal more tenuous than it seemed to many advocates of both.”2
The Roman people under the monarchy possessed the right to vote for their king, a
rudimentary form of the freedom to participate in government. Livy, however, denies that the
people were free to any degree before the founding of the Republic. What, then, is the Roman
idea of liberty that Livy believes to be lacking under the monarchy? And how does the transition
to Republic fulfill his vision of freedom?

The Importance of Imperium
Two ideas at the root of Roman sociopolitical institutions must be defined. The first is
imperium. At its simplest, it is the power to rule over others. This idea was present from the
very beginning of Roman government, since there can be no government without an ability to
execute the law and maintain the existence of the state. While every government has some such
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basic principle of rule over others, the uniquely Roman aspect of imperium was its limitlessness.
He who possessed imperium was above the law, and was “over all people and all causes
supreme.”3
The basis of this unconditional authority can be found in the ancient customary
designation of paterfamilias: the father of a Roman family held the power of life and death over
the rest of his household, and was expected to rule over them responsibly. Since the first of these
patres became the first senators, it made sense to the Romans that the Senate should hold
fatherly power over the Roman nation. This is the first of many examples of how the Roman
state is more of a reflection of the familial and social relations of the Roman community than the
product of abstract political theorizing. Maintaining the analogy to the paterfamilias, the Senate
placed their collective authority into the king, ensuring the absolute power of a single father of
the nation. For both the monarchy and most of the Republic, the Senate is the ultimate
receptacle of imperium. When the individual executive holder of imperium (whether king,
consul, or emperor) dies or otherwise loses his authority, the imperium goes back to the Senate.
As seen in the opening anecdote of this chapter, keeping imperium in the hands of the senators
can only ever be a short-term solution. Just as it is hard to govern a family by committee, so the
Romans accepted the fact that government simply works better when imperium is consolidated
into as few individuals as possible at a time. Even after the monarchy was dismantled, imperium
continued to be granted to usually no more individuals than the two consuls (and sometimes only
to one, in the case of dictators), though with strict term length limits. Whatever the political
situation, some individual or group had to possess imperium at the risk of the entire government
falling apart. Thus, even at its weakest moments in Roman political history, the Senate still
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retained the final possession of imperium so as to ensure the continuing stability of the Roman
state.
Although such unconditional authority could be and was abused, the Romans seemed to
trust an imperium-based government because of its effective management of the nation and its
similarities to Roman familial relations. Since imperium is so intertwined with the existence of
the state itself, it is easier to understand why the Romans accepted a monarchical system for so
long despite its tyrannical disadvantages. For a fledgling city-state like Rome, survival is the
highest priority, and granting unlimited authority to the government enables the administration to
more quickly and efficiently respond to potentially nation-ending disasters. There would be
much less concern for individual rights when there is a significant risk of losing a secure territory
for the community. Some minor oppression was most likely seen as an acceptable price to pay
for stability and security.
After two centuries of monarchy, however, the need for unfettered power in the hands of
a single man lost its existential edge. With Rome now an established kingdom with less risk of
being suddenly annihilated, its citizens may have begun to see the unchecked nature of the king’s
power as less necessary. One of the primary purposes of imperium, to prevent Rome from being
conquered by a foreign power, could also have been thrown into question by the presence of
foreign Etruscan rulers on the Roman throne in the latter half of the monarchy. When those
same foreign rulers began to disregard the electoral process and use violence against their own
citizens to maintain their power, imperium began to seem insufficient as the sole governing
principle of the nation.
With that theory in mind, it would seem that the end of the monarchy was a long time
coming, despite its portrayal in literature as an unexpected and quite sudden sort of revolution.
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Livy portrays Lucius Junius Brutus’s ousting of the last king as a rather spontaneous event, with
Brutus so overcome with emotion at the rape of Lucretia that he suddenly decides to overthrow
the entire governing system. The strangeness of his actions is emphasized by the reactions of his
friends, “wondering at the marvelous situation, whence arose a new character in the chest of
Brutus.” (Livy, 1.59) If we are to believe that the Tarquin family’s oppressive actions, of which
the rape of Lucretia seems to have been the final straw, were the sole motivation for Brutus’s
uprising, then it would seem reasonable for him to simply depose the Tarquins and initiate an
election for a new king. Instead he goes further, ending the whole institution of the monarchy
and establishing an entirely new system of government, complete with a public oath to never
have a king ever again. Though rage may supply the weapons, revising a political system takes a
calmer mind; Brutus probably did not suddenly invent the idea of a republic upon seeing
Lucretia’s corpse. Such liberal aspirations must have been brewing for quite some time, and it
would seem that Brutus’s greater accomplishment was the recognition of the perfect
sociopolitical moment to make significant changes to Rome’s relationship with imperium.
Lucretia’s death and Tarquin’s temporary absence from the city allowed Brutus to capitalize on
the citizens’ latent outrage and peacefully adjust the employment of imperium in Roman
government.

Libertas of the State
At this moment in Roman history, imperium becomes tempered by a second governing
principle: libertas. Both Livy and Tacitus state that Brutus established libertas concurrently with
the Republic, as if the concept of freedom did not exist in the Roman consciousness before the
Republic. (Livy 2.1, Tacitus Ann. 1.1) More accurately, it would seem that Brutus is the one
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who decided that imperium is no longer so valuable to the Roman state that there is no room for
libertas.
But what is libertas? At its most simplistic, it describes freedom from a master. From
Tacitus’ perspective, it entails both the negative and positive aspects of liberty: freedom from
being ruled as well as freedom to participate in ruling.4 This absolute definition would place
libertas directly at odds with imperium; there cannot be one person ruling over another if
everyone is free from being ruled by anyone else. Since the two concepts are incompatible as
absolute principles, and imperium is necessary for the survival of the state, it becomes very easy
for a young Rome to choose imperium as the founding principle and not give libertas a second
thought.
But as the benefits of imperium gradually decreased, its cost (measured in oppression, or
lack of libertas) increased, until Brutus took the opportunity to place the two concepts on
separate spectra in the Republic. He did not replace imperium with libertas; to do so would have
dismantled the government and might have reduced the scope of political authority to individual
families and tribes, back to the original paterfamilias. Brutus maintained imperium, but,
paradoxically, limited the government’s use of unlimited power. When a single king possessed
imperium, there was no legal way that anyone could tell him not to do something. But with the
imperium granted to two people, they each possessed unlimited power, including the power to
veto the actions of the other. These two people would be the consuls. In the beginning of the
Republic, the consuls were different from kings only in their term length (one year) and the fact
that there were two of them. The Senate remained the same supreme background authority it had
always been, and the people’s assembly continued to elect executive officials just as they had
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elected the monarchs, although now there were a few more types of electable magistrates and the
assembly also now voted on laws.
The changes seem few and technical, but they seem to be the first step toward building a
culture of libertas where once was only imperium. Even Livy, after praising the advent of
libertas, admits that Brutus may have gone too far in giving the appearance of libertas in every
little detail. He allowed only one consul to carry the fasces at a time, lest the people think that
there was now double the tyranny; he gave most of the king’s ceremonial duties to a separate
official called the pontifex maximus; and he even recommended that his fellow consul resign the
office since he bore the name “Tarquin.” (Livy, 2.2) Brutus’s paranoia at even the small
aesthetic details was not completely unjustified. The Roman Republic was surrounded by
kingdoms ruled by kings who had an interest in squelching such radical political innovations,
and there was a serious concern that the Etruscans would bribe their way back into kingship. As
odd as it sounds to modern ears, strict ideological conformity was necessary to maintain a state
that made room for libertas.
The existential crisis that arose from being surrounded by opposing regimes may have
prevented Brutus from enacting as many substantial liberal reforms as he might have envisioned;
imperium would have regained its former importance in the face of such threats. Safeguarding
imperium was so important that even having just two possessors was considered a potential
Achilles’ heel of the new government. If the nation was in imminent danger, and both consuls
vetoed the actions of the other, the government would be hamstrung and unable to protect the
state. This concern led to the creation of the position of dictator, a temporary wielder of
unchecked power whose sole purpose was to steer the nation through crises. Obviously, this is a
terribly similar role to that of the king; even with a six-month term length, a dictator could
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potentially be just as tyrannical as he operates above most of the laws. The delicate balance
between imperium and libertas characterizes the specific political institutions of the early days of
the Republic. Adcock succinctly explains the disparate motivations of the Republicans: “…the
Romans contrived to preserve the absolute efficacy of the imperium while providing safeguards
against the dangers of lasting disunion through plurality and of lasting autocracy through
indivisibility.”5

Libertas of the Individual
The careful separation of powers and maintenance of a strict hierarchy helped to balance
imperium and libertas on a national level, but what does libertas mean for the common Roman
citizen? He ought to be enjoying the simple pleasure of not having an oppressive ruler, but
theoretically the consuls, dictators, and Senate have just as much potential to encroach upon a
poor plebeian’s life. The new culture of libertas, however, becomes not just a check on tyranny
at the national level, but a protection against oppression on a more interpersonal level. The first
concept of inherent individual rights in Roman society has arisen. Previously, any rights granted
to the citizens were at the whim of the king, and could be just as whimsically revoked. But with
the new cultural emphasis on libertas, the common man now had a baseline for how much
freedom he possessed merely by virtue of being a Roman citizen. One of the earliest
accomplishments in codifying such a sense of rights was the creation of the Twelve Tables in
450 B.C.E. As one would expect from a Roman legal document, the Tables are entirely
practically-oriented; any abstract ideals about freedom and justice must be derived from the
solutions that the Tables provide for day-to-day disputes. Many of the Tables deal with property
rights, which has been a significant foundation for free societies throughout history. Others
5

Adcock 1959:9.

17
provide protocols for remedying interpersonal injuries, laying out specific penalties for stealing
and forbidding the killing of anyone without a formal trial. Though rather minimalistic by
modern standards, this new basic set of expected rights extended “freedom from tyranny” down
to the most mundane interactions between citizens, preventing people from building pyres less
than sixty feet from one’s house and introducing harsh penalties for enchanting someone with an
incantation.
The Republic seems to have a solid foundation on which to build a comprehensive
“freedom from tyranny,” from the checks on imperium to a rudimentary acknowledgment of
inherent individual rights. Freedom to participate in government, however, initially seems to be
roughly the same as during the monarchy. The Centuriate Assembly and the Tribal Assembly
were both carried over from the monarchy, though the Republic granted them more power.
Since they are no longer beholden to a king, the Assemblies now play a larger, more uninhibited
role in the enacting of legislation. But the composition of the Assemblies still heavily favors the
upper-class Romans; citizens with more property and a patrician bloodline are much more likely
to be able to enact their will in the Assemblies than someone poor or plebeian. The unequal
representation of classes in the Assemblies leads to a period of time called the Conflict of the
Orders, which was either a serious situation of civil strife with multiple plebeian uprisings6 or
just a series of gradual adjustments to the Roman constitution with little actual conflict,7
depending on different scholars’ perspectives. However dire the struggle was, it resulted in some
significant gains for plebeians in the realm of civic participation. The most notable is the
creation of the Plebeian Council, a plebs-only Assembly in which there was no (direct) way for
patricians to trample on the views of the common people.

6
7

Abbott 1901.
Mitchell 1990.

18
But most such governmental adjustments still fall more within the purview of freedom
from tyranny than freedom to participate; with their Council, the plebs are now more protected
from the potential tyranny of the patricians. In general, it seems that the early Republican
Romans valued freedom from tyranny much more than freedom to participate. Though the
Roman people used to vote for their king, the position most similar to a king in breadth of power,
the dictator, is appointed without the will of the people. It would seem that giving up the ability
to vote in that case is considered an easy price to pay for severely restricted term lengths. In few
areas was the use of popular elections expanded during the transition to Republic; the system
remained rather rigidly hierarchical, with the Senate remaining above and behind all other
aspects of government. It would seem that Lucius Junius Brutus made the Roman state so
antagonistic, both culturally and institutionally, toward tyranny that voting and other forms of
political participation never came to be seen as necessary for the protection of libertas. If
anything, it was the system of voting in the Assemblies that caused most of the plebeians’
anxiety, worried that the patricians were becoming a collective tyrant. The Roman idea of
libertas, in preventing incidents of tyranny on the large scale, also gave the Roman people a
sense of trust in their government, lessening the need for mass direct political participation.
In his outsider’s perspective on the Roman state, the Greek historian Polybius describes
the unique Roman situation in a way that captures the apparent tension between executive
imperium and the participation of the citizens. He portrays the Roman state as a combination of
the three archetypal government types: rule by the one, rule by the few, and rule by the many.
“For if one fixed one's eyes on the power of the consuls, the constitution seemed completely
monarchical and royal; if on that of the senate it seemed again to be aristocratic; and when one
looked at the power of the masses, it seemed clearly to be a democracy.” (Polybius, Histories,
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6.11) Although the consuls and Senate seem to have almost unlimited power in their respective
spheres, Polybius places great emphasis on the power of the people as the lynchpin that holds
Roman society together. Besides the aforementioned legislative duties, the Roman people
“bestow office on the deserving, the noblest regard of virtue in a state… Thus here again one
might plausibly say that the people's share in the government is the greatest, and that the
constitution is a democratic one.” (Polybius, Hist., 6.14) Polybius sees the imbuement of the
government with virtue as the most noteworthy effect of Roman democracy. The relationship
between virtue and government will be investigated further in the final chapter, but insofar as
increased public virtue was a notable benefit to the Roman Republic, the detriment of its absence
in the following two cases ought to be considered.
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Chapter Two: Failures of Modern Democratic Transitions
The Roman transition from monarchy to republic was remarkable in its swiftness,
originality, and resulting stability. The Republic lasted for nearly 500 years; after that much
time, it seems safe to conclude that its collapse was not due to some inherent weakness in their
governing institutions. Such a transition from an authoritarian government to a free society
ought to be even easier in modern times, since we have contemplated democratic political
philosophy for centuries and there is a good handful of countries with stable traditions of
individual liberty. One might think that any modern country attempting to transition to a
republican form of government should be able to simply institute copies of the democratic
institutions that have worked so well in other established democracies.
However, since the end of World War II, the success rate of such democratic transitions
has been hit-or-miss. Many developing countries have cast off their colonial overlords or local
monarchs and attempted to instantly take up the democratic institutions that have worked so well
in some of the world’s most powerful countries. But their role models, countries like the United
States and Great Britain, took centuries of growing pains to reach the fully operational
democracies that they are today; the sudden transitions in many developing countries seem to
lack certain stabilizing factors that the developed democracies took a long time to achieve.
One of those stabilizing factors might be the gradual introduction of popular voting into
established republics. Electoral systems are often seen as the most essential aspect of
democracy, and thus are one of the first institutions created when a modern country declares
itself to be a democracy. It is evident that many societies in the world have elections and are
patently not democracies; sham elections are often implemented by openly authoritarian regimes
in order not to appear completely deviant from international norms.
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But many well-intentioned electoral systems also seem prone to rapidly devolve into a
less-than-free society. Though the voting is relatively free and fair, the resulting governments
seem to take the support of the people as a mandate to ignore constitutional restrictions and favor
consolidating their own imperium over the libertas of the populace. By the time the people
become frustrated with the elected ruler, the demagogue has gained enough power to influence
the electoral system and maintain his power indefinitely.
By this point, formal democracy has been abandoned, and the people often turn to the
military to use raw force to change the regime. After successfully overthrowing the elected
leader, the military then installs a new president for the restored “democracy,” legitimized by the
people’s support of the military. In such scenarios, the monolithic “people’s will” is wielded by
those in power like a blank check; the government is a democracy insofar as its imperium is
derived from the people, but the individual citizens have no power left to influence those
governing them. The pendulum of governing philosophy has swung from a monarch whose
power is completely removed from the populace to a series of dictators whose legitimacy is
drawn from some impersonal, collective spirit of “the people.” Somewhere in the transition from
one extreme to the other, the ideas of individual liberty and political efficacy were passed over
and discarded.
Although there are many additional factors that influence the success or failure of nascent
democracies, this chapter will focus on the contributions of voting itself to the stability or chaos
of specific democratic regimes in the past century. After becoming independent sovereign
nations, countries such as Zimbabwe, Cambodia, South Sudan, and South Vietnam attempted to
establish democratic institutions. All of these four cases either failed or are currently failing to
maintain stable and free democratic governments. For two of these cases, I will examine the role
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of voting in the initial selection of the regime as well as the particular moment when the
individual power of the voter was either effectively nullified or transformed into a collective
“people’s will.”

Mugabe’s Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe’s transition to a sovereign democratic government was not a clean-cut
transformation from pure autocracy to democracy. In 1965, a white minority in the country
declared independence from Great Britain under the name Rhodesia. Rhodesia had all the
ingredients of a republic, with a parliamentary system and voting and a codification of equal
rights. However, the requirements for eligible voters were constructed so that the black majority
of the country would be excluded, giving most of the governing authority to the white minority.
Though nominally a democracy, Rhodesia was clearly in the hands of an oligarchical white
minority. The prime minister, Ian Smith, and his party held onto power for the entirety of the
government’s 15-year lifespan. His administration showed no intention of implementing
universal suffrage, despite urging by Great Britain, who saw “majority rule” as necessary for
newly independent colonies.
Such a concentration of power with the outward appearance of democracy seems to
resemble the voting of the Roman people for their monarchs, who were confirmed by the
unelected Senate. With the black majority chafing under the oligarchic oppression, the Republic
of Rhodesia eventually yielded to majority rule after a costly war against several revolutionary
guerilla armies. But simple concessions to the majority were not enough; the entire Rhodesian
governing system was thrown out, and the new country Zimbabwe was formed with an entirely
new democratic government.
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The initial creation of Zimbabwe seems like a carefully planned and designed
implementation of a well-oiled democracy. The official terms of Zimbabwean independence
were overseen and officially recognized by Great Britain. A constitution was drawn up, creating
a House of Assembly comprised of 100 members, 20 of which were reserved for white elected
officials. In 1980, the first elections were held, overseen by British officials and approved by the
international community.
When he was deposed in late 2017 after 37 years of rule, the Zimbabwean President
Robert Mugabe was the world’s oldest living head of state. In the late 1970s, he entered politics
as the leader of one of the victorious guerilla armies in the war against the Rhodesian
government, and was therefore hailed as the hero of the revolution by his country’s people. Just
as Lucius Junius Brutus led the Roman people to freedom and was then elected their first consul,
Mugabe’s election as Zimbabwe’s first prime minister makes sense as the outcome of the
country’s first act of voting. Since this was the first time that the black majority of Zimbabwe
had the power to influence their national governing officials, it was only natural that they would
vote for a party and a leader whose platform focused on giving power to the majority. The new
electoral system, with its universal suffrage, seemed to directly result in the expansion of
personal liberty.
Once in power, however, Mugabe and his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU), began to bend democracy to their will. Although competing political parties are
usually a sign of a healthy democracy, relations quickly became heated between the ZANU, the
white minority Rhodesian Front, and another revolutionary party called the Zimbabwe African
People’s Union (ZAPU). Political and ethnic differences came to a head in 1983. In an event
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called Gukurahundi, ZANU-affiliated paramilitary troops murdered tens of thousands of
“political dissidents” allegedly connected to ZAPU over the course of several months.8
What happened? The liberty that was supposed to be granted by a democratic form of
government seems to have run out after only a few years of Zimbabwean sovereignty. The
elections of 1980, so carefully set up and successfully carried out, somehow resulted in more
oppression, not less. The system of checks and balances, so important in the Roman Republic,
seem to be broken in the case of Zimbabwe. If a government leader breaks the law, a citizen of a
free society would expect the police or military to arrest him and enforce the law. But what
happens when the bearers of military force simply go along with whatever the leader says?
Mugabe, as a former military leader, seems to have had enough sway with his old troops that
they were more willing to follow his commands than obey the restrictions of a constitution
created through compromise with their rivals.
Does it take only one charismatic leader and a group of loyal followers to throw a wrench
in democracy? So far, it would seem so. But the massacre of Gukurahundi, however heinous
and unthinkable, was still carried out by a democratically-elected government, chosen by the
people from among several competing political parties. It is not until 1987 that the democratic
institutions in Zimbabwe begin to thoroughly crumble. Despite their previous disputes, the
ZANU and ZAPU parties reconciled by combining their parties into the Zimbabwe African
National Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Since they were already the two largest parties, the new
combined party would seem to eliminate any possibility of other parties competing with ZANUPF for governing power. By itself, though, the creation of a vastly dominant political party is not
necessarily the death knell of democratic freedom; plenty of parliamentary governments in other
countries can get things done only when competing parties form large coalitions to pass
8
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legislation. The truly anti-democratic aspect of the situation is explicitly stated in the Unity
Accord, the agreement which formed the ZANU-PF. Among other declarations of intent, the
sixth statement announces, “That ZANU-PF shall seek to establish a one-party state in
Zimbabwe.” (Unity Accord, 1987)
This blatant disregard for competing political positions removes any last hope that
democracy in Zimbabwe would safeguard freedom. In the same year, Mugabe created the office
of the president as a separate executive branch, granting himself further governing authority and
freedom from the parliament. With such sweeping institutional changes, Zimbabwe would
become a democracy only in the sense that Mugabe derives his power from the support of his
followers, and just as he used them to consolidate his power over the decades, so could anyone
else overthrow Mugabe’s regime with enough of their own loyal supporters.
And so the cycle of oppression and violence would continue, with democracy never more
than a façade. After struggling for so many years against a government that oppressed one
portion of the population, President Mugabe swung the pendulum in the other direction. Since
white citizens owned a vast majority of the land in Zimbabwe, Mugabe made efforts to
redistribute the land more equitably. Unfortunately, his “fast-track land reform” program
eventually became nothing more than a way to centralize more power; land confiscated from
white farmers was nationalized and placed under the control of Mugabe loyalists. After several
decades of pressuring and harassing white farmers, by 2013 there were no white-owned farms
left outside the control of the government.9 No compensation was given for the confiscated land,
and the white farmers were left with nothing.
Just as the Rhodesian government excluded the black majority from most political
participation, the Mugabe administration was able to discriminate against the white minority.
9
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This time, however, being in the minority, the white citizens had no hope of successfully
mounting an armed rebellion, and several attempts to sue the government resulted in the white
farmers getting beaten up in their homes. Although there are codified rights and laws that ought
to have protected the white farmers, there is not much a minority can achieve in the face of a
majority that believes the minority is getting its just deserts.
After being under the rule of a de facto dictator for several decades, however, even the
majority of Zimbabweans began to tire of Mugabe’s attempts to bend the rules and accomplish
his goals through force. In the elections of 2008, a new presidential candidate, Morgan
Tsvangirai, received the support of the majority. Mugabe allegedly manipulated the final
election and reinstalled himself as president, but the will of the people had turned away from
him. He and Tsvangirai signed a power-sharing agreement, allowing Mugabe to remain in
control of the military while the general populace was mollified by having Tsvangirai as prime
minister.
The arrangement shows that the people of Zimbabwe do still have some political clout;
even if the freedom-ensuring aspects of democracy are gone, the collective will of the people still
has the ability to affect the governing authority. But what good is it? If the Zimbabweans had
voted Mugabe completely out of power and Tsvangirai assumed the presidency, there seems to
be no assurance that Tsvangirai would be any less authoritarian than Mugabe. In the case of
Zimbabwe, democracy seems to be less “rule by the people” and more “rule by the most popular
person at the moment.” Once the people have voted, they seem to give up their political efficacy
until the next presidential election. At this point, a government based on voting seems to breed
just as much oppression and violation of rights as the prior monarchical or colonial
administrations, and seems to be even less stable.
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The removal of Mugabe from power does not seem to have improved the situation in
Zimbabwe. His replacement, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was installed after a military coup and is
nicknamed “The Crocodile” for his cunning political maneuvers and his record of gruesome
atrocities. Even an official of the ruling ZANU-PF party expressed concern about the future
leader: “You think Mugabe is bad, but have you thought that whoever comes after him could be
even worse?”10 The role of the individual Zimbabwean citizen has been marginalized, and
though the democracy remains in name, the future of the country seems solidly in the hands of
those individuals with the most power.

Sihanouk’s Cambodia
A similar situation of democracy gone bad occurred in post-colonial Cambodia. Just as
Zimbabwe was preceded by a pseudo-republican government, so did Cambodia have voting and
elected assemblies under French colonial rule. After achieving independence in 1953, however,
the Cambodian electoral system became even less free and fair. Despite the oversight of an
International Control Commission, the initial elections in the sovereign Kingdom of Cambodia
provide some of the most blatant examples of disregard for the individual rights and freedoms
that we have come to expect from democracy.
The king of Cambodia, Norodum Sihanouk, stepped down from the figurehead position
in order to directly participate in the first elections in 1955. He formed his own right-wing
political party, the Sangkum, in order to combat the popular Democrats. Sihanouk then
proceeded to use his influence as former king to intimidate the voters and manipulate election
results. Many voters were not allowed to cast secret ballots, instead casting votes with colored
pieces of paper in view of Sihanouk’s police force. The Sangkum won with a suspicious 83% of
10
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the vote and gained all the seats in the assembly, effectively taking complete control of the
government.
With the right amount of charisma and personal supporters, it would appear to take only a
single brief occurrence of electoral democracy for a demagogue to coopt the entire government.
Sihanouk carried much gravitas as the former monarch who gained Cambodia’s independence,
and his Sangkum party platform was extremely nationalistic. Writing in 1967, Smith describes
the relationship between Sihanouk and the Cambodian people: “So much has Sihanouk identified
himself with his country and people that any criticism of them is regarded by him as a personal
affront, and any attack on him is considered as an insult to Cambodia's dignity and honor.”11
If the people truly did love him as a leader, then was the Cambodian democracy a
success? Just as in Zimbabwe, Cambodian democracy succeeded only in selecting a ruler with
an incredible amount of sway among the majority (though with such fraudulent elections, the
will of the actual majority is difficult to determine). Though Sihanouk seemed to have
widespread support, it helped that he brutally harassed and intimidated leading members of the
opposing Democratic party. Within two years of the first elections, the Democrats had
disbanded as a political party, with the last few leaders begging to be admitted into the Sangkum.
To further solidify his authority, Sihanouk emphasized the nationalistic aspects of
Buddhism, the majority religion in Cambodia. The idea was to encourage the wealthy to give to
the poor, but in practice the wealth was seized by the state and then distributed to Sihanouk’s
loyalists, in much the same way that Mugabe “redistributed” white farmers’ land in Zimbabwe.
By playing different segments of society against each other, both rulers were able to reward the
loyalty of their supporters and utterly marginalize their opponents.
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After proclaiming himself permanent Head of State and becoming increasingly brutal in
silencing political dissidents, Sihanouk was eventually deposed in a military coup. Cambodia
was then plunged into a multi-faceted civil war, and all semblance of democracy disappeared
with the victory of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge.

How Do Democracies Survive?
With Zimbabwe and Cambodia as our examples, it would seem that democracies are a
disturbingly tenuous form of government. In each case, the groundwork for a democracy was
laid quite meticulously. Each country had legislative assemblies, multiple political parties, a
constitution, and laws protecting the rights of its citizens. The initial elections in both countries
were even supervised by an international third party to ensure fairness.
In both cases, the elections were won by the party of the leader who gained the country’s
independence. There is nothing ostensibly wrong with the people voting into power a person
whom they believe will be a good leader; in fact, that seems to be the best outcome that a popular
democracy can hope to achieve. But this best-case scenario does not prevent these national
heroes from becoming demagogues, using the mandate of the people to perform whatever actions
suit them.
Are there not checks and balances included in the building blocks of democracy that were
present in these countries? Theoretically, the legislative assembly should have some sort of
power to restrict the actions of the executive. The judiciary, likewise, should have the power to
point out when the legislature or executive are out of line with regards to the constitution. And
finally, the military and police ought to be subordinate to the duly elected government and not
take it upon themselves to “fix” the government by force.
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In the face of such catastrophic governmental failures, however, these checks seem like
pure wishful thinking. As soon as some really charismatic person and their party of diehard
followers gains a majority of power, the whole system falls apart. When all the “separate”
powers are working toward the same goal, there is no reason to restrict the power of another
branch. The legislators know that the executive is working in their interest, and the military
know that the leader will use his power to “redistribute” the country’s wealth in their favor. A
few choice minorities end up trampled, but the majority of the populace remains complacent,
happy with their choice of administration and confident in their ability to change things the next
time an election comes around (though by then it will probably be too late).
Thus it would seem that democracies are only as democratic as the current administration
wants them to be, and voting seems to lead the populace into a false sense of political efficacy.
If a popular government comes into power and decides to outright ignore the constitution, there
seems to be nothing that can prevent such a decision. There may be some public outcry, but the
administration has the support of the majority, and the military can silence any dissidents.
Though it sounds extremely cynical, it seems like the success of a democracy depends entirely
on whether or not the citizens and administration decide to act like it is a free democracy. If
even just one influential person decides to treat their country like their own personal monarchy,
Zimbabwe and Cambodia have shown us how quickly the thread of democracy can be pulled and
unraveled.
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Chapter 3: The Value of Democracy
From the examples in previous chapters, it can be seen that democracies can last
hundreds of years or fizzle out in an instant. Representative government is hailed for its inherent
stability, yet seems just as vulnerable to chaotic regime change and authoritarianism as any other
government structure. When comparing the successes and failures of different democratic
regimes, it can be difficult to fully separate the outcomes from the specific circumstances under
which the government operated. Though the individual cases offer concrete examples of
democracy’s benefits and shortcomings, such pros and cons must now be examined in the
abstract.
Determining the worth of democratic government in general first requires the answering
of a few philosophical questions. First, what is the purpose of government? If an objective
purpose of government can be agreed upon, then the structures of various forms of government
can be judged according to how well they align with that general purpose. Is democracy the
form of government which best effects the purpose of government? And if it is not, what
changes ought to be made to it?
Aristotle and John Stuart Mill both propose intriguing answers to these questions.
Despite being separated by thousands of years of history, each philosopher provides methodical
analyses of the issues of democratic government irrespective of any specific historical regime.
Their explanations of the purpose of government are particularly potent because each is founded
on that philosopher’s peculiar system of ethics. We might expect, therefore, that Aristotle’s
virtue ethics and Mill’s utilitarianism would produce vastly different premises for a purpose of
government. However, both Aristotle and Mill base their ethical systems on the inherent value
of happiness, and thus their political philosophies emerge from similar roots.
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Aristotle’s Virtuous Purpose
The link between happiness and the purpose of government in Aristotle is not
immediately evident in his writings and requires some explanation. For a book primarily
concerned with how people ought to interact in community with each other, Aristotle’s Politics
spends little time discussing what makes individual humans happy. At first glance, Aristotle’s
humans can seem like mindless cogs in the machine of society. So what place does happiness
have in Aristotle’s view of politics? Despite his limited explanation of happiness itself, many of
Aristotle’s ideas would work only in a world where humans make choices based on what would
benefit them the most. Though Aristotle describes it using objective, impersonal terms like
“virtue” and “best,” his political philosophy is founded on the idea that each human yearns to
work toward higher happiness.
First, let us examine Aristotle’s connection between happiness and the “best” things.
Aristotle’s main goal seems to be to create the best possible city with the best possible regime
ruling the best possible people. But what does he mean by “best”? At one point, Aristotle
discusses the possibility that the most choiceworthy regime is the best. This seems like a direct
appeal to human happiness: whatever one desires, it is best to have. And at first it seems like this
version of “best” would be a relative term; surely the Spartans believed that their military
oligarchy was the best regime, and other nations consider their own regime the best, leaving no
measure for an objectively best regime. But Aristotle explains that the Spartans incorrectly
believe that domination over others to be choiceworthy. He refutes this domineering sense of the
word “best” when he claims that, “to assign what is not equal to equal persons and what is not
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similar to similar persons is contrary to nature, and nothing contrary to nature is noble.” (Politics
7.3.1325b8-10)
So the best things are still the most choiceworthy, but Aristotle has narrowed the
definition of what is truly choiceworthy: a choiceworthy action is in accordance with nature and
strives toward higher goals. Actions based on a desire to hold power over other human beings
are not worthy of choice because it goes against our nature, which urges us to strive for things
which will give higher pleasures. Does this stifle the human yearning for happiness at all, by
restricting desires to only “natural” and “noble” ventures? Aristotle would disagree, for the
nobler pursuits of happiness are worth far more than any low brutish desire for dominance. But
nonetheless, humans seem to have such contra-natural desires anyway, distracting them from
their longing for greater happiness. To discourage ignoble choices and encourage noble ones,
Aristotle relies on virtue.
Virtue, as described by Aristotle, is the means by which the common man can achieve the
greatest happiness and the best things. Rather than assuming humans will automatically become
idealistic nationalists when placed in a political environment, Aristotle knows that humans will
work the best when they are working for their own good and happiness. He is so sure of this that
he declares it “evident” in order to use it as a premise for the rest of the discussion: “Now that
everyone strives for living well and for happiness is evident.” (Pol. 7.13.1331b40) To focus this
innate yearning for nobler living, Aristotle lays out a two-step process in order to guide people
from their barbaric lives of unfocused passions toward a life lived well: “…one of these is in the
correct positing of the aim and end of actions; the other, discovering the actions that bear on the
end.” (Pol. 7.13.1331b29-30) It has already been established that the ultimate end is happiness,
and Aristotle claims this can be achieved by living virtuously.
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But simply being told that one must be virtuous to be happy is often not enough to
convince one to take action toward becoming virtuous. Aristotle explains that people must be
reasoned with so that they realize the greater happiness that can be gained by living virtuously.
According to Aristotle, there are three things by which man becomes excellent in virtue: nature,
habit, and reason. With regards to nature, someone must “develop naturally as a human being
and not some of the other animals.” (Pol. 7.13.1332a41-42) Presumably this is required so that
the person possesses the peculiar innate longing for greater happiness. If they have this inherent
desire, then “living virtuously” becomes a matter of honing this desire for higher things through
habit: “certain qualities are ambiguous in their nature, and through habits develop in the direction
of worse or better.” (Pol. 7.13.1332b2-4) Once a human reaches adulthood, most of their
conceptions of what makes them happy are set in habit.
But through reason, humans can still work towards nobler goals and higher happiness
which they have not yet made into habit: “For men act in many ways contrary to their
habituation and their nature through reason, if they are persuaded that some condition is better.”
(Pol. 7.13.1332b6-8) So while it is clear that all well-developed and habituated humans want to
perform actions which will move them toward the end goal of highest happiness, they may have
disordered ends and be working toward a lower form of happiness without realizing it.
Aristotle’s solution to misguided happiness-seeking humans is education. He believes that if
children are educated with a view to the noblest of ends and the actions and virtues which will
take them there, they will certainly choose to live virtuously as adults, since the highest
happiness is always choiceworthy once people are pointed in its direction.
Keeping in mind this premise that people will choose higher goals over baser desires, we
must see why they would choose to live in a city and how the best city stands in relation to
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happiness. Aristotle asserts in one definition of the city that “…the city is a community of
similar persons, for the sake of a life that is the best possible.” (Pol. 7.8.1328a35-36) Assuming
that these similar persons all have a view to the higher good, the city itself will be directed
toward noble goals. With this in mind, then, the best city is the one in which every citizen is
encouraged to live virtuously.
Aristotle contrasts this ideal version of a city with the contemporary cities of Greece,
which are not made up of people who are similar in virtue. The contemporary cities are made up
of many people of differing views with regards to what is choiceworthy and what will make
them happy. Therefore, the Greek cities do what seems immediately best in such a situation:
they focus on the things that are evidently useful to all citizens, and ignore nobler goals which
must be discerned through education. The Greek cities in this way encourage happiness, but
only in the forms which immediately appeal to their citizens’ baser conceptions of happiness.
Sparta, Aristotle’s perennial example of a seemingly-successful city, focuses primarily on honing
the natural drive toward warfare in its citizens. Fighting and conquest is easily seen as a good
thing because domination provides happiness, but since they have focused solely on that and
neglected nobler goals, the Spartans have been stunted in their approach to happiness and are not
on the virtuous path to higher goals. If we are trying to create the best possible city, as Aristotle
describes, then it must be focused on encouraging and developing noble virtues in its citizens in
order for them to attain the highest happiness.

Virtue in Democracy
So if the purpose of government is to cultivate virtuous excellence, how well does
democracy carry out such a task? Although he lives in democratic Athens, Aristotle has some
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serious misgivings about the effectiveness of democracy as an agent of virtue and producer of
happiness. In his description of the different types of possible constitutions, Aristotle places
democracy on a spectrum of “government by the many.” At one end of the spectrum is “polity,”
which he defines as the many ruling for the sake of the common interest. Presumably this
common interest is the highest happiness previously mentioned. On the other end of this
spectrum is what Aristotle calls “democracy,” the many ruling for their own self-interest. He
claims that the self-centered goal of a democratic regime is a perversion of the morally-good and
selfless polity regime.
This distinction between common and self-interest ought to raise eyebrows. If we are to
take Aristotle’s thoughts on virtue seriously, then such a distinction between common interest
and self-interest should be nonexistent. Both the common interest and individual self-interest
ought to be striving for the highest happiness. Thus, a regime directed toward the common
interest and a regime directed toward many different individual interests ought to be
indistinguishable in their actions and policies.
Since Aristotle does draw a distinction, however, it must be assumed that such selfinterest is not merely the striving of an individual toward the highest good, but rather the
fulfillment of an individual’s baser desires. A society based on such fulfillment could rightfully
be distinguished from a regime that focused on the common good, since the former would result
in the chaotic fulfillment of whatever whims each individual might have. And since individuals
are often selfish, only a polity focused on the common interest would be able to promote the
highest happiness in every individual. Though he recognizes and criticizes the weaknesses of
democracy, Aristotle seems to believe that such a certain type of democratic regime could still
fulfill the purpose of government: to encourage virtue and strive for the highest happiness.
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Mill’s Virtuous Purpose
John Stuart Mill comes to a conclusion similar to Aristotle’s with regard to the purpose of
government. After discarding several popular notions of the goal of government, Mill gets to the
root of what allows any government to operate: the quality of its citizens. He explains that no
government can reach any end without its citizens performing their duties in accordance with the
regime’s institutions. Mill offers examples of the many ways in which any government
institution would fail if its constituent citizens decided to ignore procedure and do as they please:
“How can a representative assembly work for good if its members…, uncorrected by public
discipline or private self-control, …resort to manual violence on the floor of the House, or shoot
at one another with rifles?” (Mill, Considerations, Ch. 2) In the same way that government in
general is contrived solely by humans working in community, specific regimes only work if
humans agree to make them work.
In this way, Mill arrives at his own ultimate goal of government, which bears a striking
resemblance to that of Aristotle: “…the most important point of excellence which any form of
government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves.”
(Mill, Cons., Ch. 2) Mill’s concept of higher and lower pleasures is almost identical to
Aristotle’s ideas concerning noble and base desires, and thus Mill comes to the same conclusion:
a good government is one that promotes virtue and consequently strives for the highest
happiness.
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Virtue in Representative Democracy
Though Mill and Aristotle agree on the purpose of government, Mill has some notable
disagreements with Aristotle about the best form of government. In Aristotle’s explanation of
the various constitutions, he suggests that the “good” forms of rule by one, the few, and the many
are all relatively equally valid as methods of achieving the highest good. Monarchy is as good as
aristocracy, and aristocracy is as good as polity, as long as they do not slip into tyranny,
oligarchy, or democracy, respectively. Mill, however, takes a strong stance against rule by the
one or the few in favor of rule by the many.
Mill begins by dismissing the popular idea of a beneficent monarch as the ideal form of
government. (Mill, Cons., Ch. 3) He points out that, even if such a ruler existed and was
practically able to rule a state directly and alone, such a regime would be detrimental to the
general citizenry. Mill explains that placing all the concerns of the nation in the power of one
man reduces the rest of the citizens to passive observers, unable to make their own decisions and
thereby live virtuous lives. Though they may have their baser desires sated by the beneficence of
the monarch, their moral efficacy has been removed and they would be unable to cultivate their
higher, more preferable faculties.
Therefore, Mill places high value on political participation. He sees a fully participatory
democracy as the only way in which the entirety of the population can exercise their political
wills and work toward general virtue. Mill argues that without such participation, citizens would
probably never look beyond their own self-interest and consider themselves as part of a greater
community. And if the citizens are purely self-interested, then the government cannot perform in
accordance with its goal of encouraging virtue and the highest happiness. Thus, democracy is
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the best way to ensure that people have the ability and moral duty to individually pursue the
highest good.
Despite his ringing endorsement of popular sovereignty, Mill does acknowledge the
potential weaknesses of a democratic government. Though rather than blaming the symptoms,
such as tyranny of the majority or election of a demagogue, Mill addresses what he believes to be
the root of those problems: the inability of the citizenry to responsibly handle liberty. “When the
people are too much attached to savage independence to be tolerant of the amount of power to
which it is for their good that they should be subject, the state of society… is not yet ripe for
representative government.” (Mill, Cons., Ch. 6) At first it seems strange that such a strong
proponent of individual liberty should start pointing fingers at “savage independence,” but Mill
distinguishes between the two types of freedom that have been discussed earlier: freedom from
oppression, and freedom to participate in government.
Mill never places freedom from oppression in any doubt; he has no issues with personal
protections against the government. However, despite his promotion of full participatory
government, Mill acknowledges that there must be limits on the scope of this freedom to
participate. If people hold their ability to participate politically as their highest value, they will
be unwilling to allow any institution of government to effectively wield power over them. As
soon as an institution is put in place to exercise governmental authority, a savagely independent
people might become suspicious of the institution and use their newfound political power to
undermine it. Thus, a potentially significant factor in the success or failure of democratic
regimes could be the people’s attachment to their own political freedom.
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Conclusion
The political philosophies of Aristotle and Mill might shed some light on the intriguing
cases of Republican Rome and modern Zimbabwe and Cambodia. Each state attempted to create
a democratic government, but Rome was far more successful than the other two. Setting aside
historical and circumstantial factors, was there any inherent difference in their implementations
of democratic government that could have contributed to the states’ success or failure?
Aristotle and Mill suggest that the intended purpose of the government can be a
significant factor in the success of the regime. The best government, according to their ethical
philosophies, is that which encourages the whole community to strive for virtue and the highest
happiness. Freedom is a necessary part of living a virtuous life; without freedom, one is unable
to make moral choices and actively strive toward nobler things. Democracy is the form of
government most conducive to freedom (and, according to Mill, the only option that allows true
freedom), so it seems to be the obvious frontrunner for best possible regime.
Freedom, however, is like food. It is necessary to live a good life, and it makes us happy.
But gluttony is looked down upon as the satisfaction of a base desire, and no moralist would
suggest that food is the ultimate good in life. In the same way, freedom gives us the agency to
live virtuous lives and attain happiness, but our appetite for freedom is not one of the nobler
pleasures. Therefore, freedom should not be placed on the pedestal of the highest good, and
ought not be considered the purpose of government.
Perhaps, then, democratic governments’ success or failure is dependent on whether they
view public virtue or freedom as their highest good. The Roman Republic, created in the instant
after one of its most public symbols of virtue was brutally raped, clearly decided that the virtue
of the community was a worthy reason for discarding the old regime and installing a new form of
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government. The Romans did not seem to create a Republic for the sake of individuals’ freedom
to participate, but rather used the ability of citizens to participate to ensure that the regime
continued to encourage communal virtue. Libertas was not enshrined as a replacement for
imperium, but as an instrument to keep imperium focused on the virtuous purpose of the
Republic.
Many modern democracies, however, seem to have founded their system of government
on the idea of replacing all authority with the free participation of the people. Unfortunately, as
Mill pointed out, the concept of government relies on the ultimate exercise of authority by some
certain institution. At worst, the free political participation of all individuals becomes simply
anarchy, and at best large numbers of people throw their political weight behind a single
demagogue. Mugabe gave many Zimbabweans the political satisfaction that they desired in the
moment, but the regime lacked a focus on the higher communal good and could not maintain a
free society. Sihanouk demonstrated that the institution of voting should not be hailed as an end
in itself, since it can be manipulated by nefarious parties; rather, democracy requires a substantial
commitment on the part of all citizens to creating a virtuous political community. Cambodia’s
experiences emphasize Mill’s premise regarding the foundation of government: governments are
made up by humans, and can work only when humans decide to go along with them.
Despite the many pessimistic claims in this essay, it will conclude on a hopeful note.
Though individual democracies may fail, we can take heart in the idea that humanity has reached
the point where we can experiment with (according to Mill) the best possible regime,
representative democratic government. The fact that democratic institutions do not guarantee a
successful government by their very nature does not mean that democracy itself is a faulty
system; rather, given the cases outlined in this paper, it would seem that the fault lies in people’s
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misguided use of democracy. Of course, there are a multitude of other possible reasons for the
collapse of democratic governments, and simply orienting the regime toward the encouragement
of virtue certainly does not guarantee success. But insofar as a sense of virtue balances the
government’s need for authority and the people’s desire for freedom, virtue seems to be
necessary to prevent a democratic regime from collapsing on account of its own self-destructive
behavior.
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